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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3463 
_____________ 
 
IN RE: AVANDIA MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES AND PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LITIGATION 
 
 
PAUL DUMPSON, 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-07-md-1871 & No. 2-10-cv-02476) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 27, 2014 
 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District Judge.
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(Filed: April 25, 2014) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
                                              
1
 The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the Southern District 
of Texas, sitting by designation. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Paul Dumpson is a former user of Avandia, an oral medicine that is manufactured 
by GlaxoSmithKline and approved by the FDA to treat Type 2 diabetes. On behalf of 
himself and a class of similarly situated people,
 2
 Dumpson seeks a refund of payments 
for Avandia, including insurance co-payments. The District Court dismissed Dumpson’s 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons 
that follow, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Dumpson’s claims with prejudice.  
I. 
  Dumpson, a California resident, took Avandia to treat his Type 2 diabetes 
between 2000 and 2007. Pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(2), Dumpson subsequently filed a putative class action against 
GlaxoSmithKline in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District Court dismissed 
his original complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), but granted him leave to amend the complaint.  
 As in the original complaint, the Amended Complaint alleges that 
GlaxoSmithKline violated three California consumer protection statutes: the Consumers 
Legal Remedies Act, the Unfair Competition Law, and the False Advertising Law.
3
 See 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1750; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500. In particular, Dumpson 
alleges that GlaxoSmithKline “had longstanding knowledge of the dangers associated 
                                              
2
 No class has been certified, since the District Court did not rule on a motion for class 
certification prior to dismissing Dumpson’s complaint. 
3
 Dumpson also asserted a claim for unjust enrichment. He has not appealed the District 
Court’s dismissal of this claim.  
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with Avandia, including significant heart attack or heart-disease related risks,” but 
“concealed these dangers in order to promote its drug.” J.A. 21. He claims that 
GlaxoSmithKline’s warnings for Avandia “may not have been sufficient enough for [his] 
endocrinologist to prescribe Avandia to” him and that his doctor “might have considered 
prescribing [him] an alternative medication” had different warnings been provided. J.A. 
22. 
 The District Court dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice, holding that 
Dumpson “has not alleged any harm to him: he does not allege that his health was 
impaired by the use of Avandia, nor does he identify what he would have paid for some 
other drug had he not taken Avandia, or anything beyond that his physician ‘might have 
considered prescribing’” another medication. J.A. 5. In dismissing the Amended 
Complaint, the District Court also pointed out that Dumpson “fails to allege what 
advertising materials or information he or his (unidentified) prescribing physician read or 
relied upon.” J.A. 5. Additionally, the court denied Dumpson leave to amend the 
complaint, reasoning that “further amendment would be inequitable and likely futile” 
because the “complaint still fails to state a cause of action.” J.A. 6.  
 Dumpson appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint and its 
denial of leave to amend the complaint.
4
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 We have jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We are also 
satisfied that Dumpson’s allegations are sufficient to establish Article III standing even 
though, as set forth herein, they are legally insufficient to provide a basis for relief. See 
Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass’n., 816 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1987) (dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction is not appropriate simply because the legal theory is foreclosed or 
lacks merit). We exercise plenary review over a district court’s dismissal for failure to 
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II. 
A. 
We have carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments. For 
substantially the same reasons set forth by the District Court, we conclude that Dumpson 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, we affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of the Amended Complaint. 
B. 
We next consider whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying 
Dumpson leave to amend his complaint. A district court has “substantial leeway in 
deciding whether to grant leave to amend.” Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 
2000). Denial of leave to amend a complaint is especially appropriate where a party has 
already been given the opportunity to amend the complaint. See id. at 374 (“[W]e are 
inclined to give the District Court even broader discretion when, as here, the court has 
already granted the requesting party an opportunity to amend its complaint.”).   
Here, the District Court granted Dumpson an opportunity to amend his original 
complaint, but Dumpson failed to cure the complaint’s pleading deficiencies. We agree 
with the District Court that “further amendment would be inequitable and likely futile,” 
J.A. 6, and therefore affirm the denial of leave to amend the complaint. 
III. 
                                                                                                                                                  
state a claim. Byers v. Intuit, Inc., 600 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010). We review a district 
court’s denial of leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. In re Burlington 
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Dumpson’s 
complaint with prejudice.   
